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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we examine the interaction between social outreach and financial return in
microfinance. Running multivariate regression models and using 1,805 observations of micro-
finance institutions between 2004 and 2013, we find strong evidence suggesting that institutions
with more social engagement – in terms of outreach to the poor – earn higher portfolio yields.
We also find that measures of outreach are associated with increased operating expenses. As
return figures are influenced by both costs and yield, and because both increase to a similar
degree with the depth of outreach, these two effects lead to a zero sum result on return
measures. This finding could explain why existing studies assessing the interaction between
social outreach and different measures of financial performance in microfinance (such as return









In recent years, microfinance institutions (MFIs)
have become increasingly concerned with achiev-
ing financial sustainability. With the evolution of
the financial systems or market systems approach
(Ledgerwood 1999; Burjorjee and Scola 2015), and
with changing guidelines for funders, more com-
mercial investors – such as banks and specialized
asset managers – have become involved in micro-
finance (CGAP 2007; Dieckmann 2007). As
a result, financially sustainable institutions receive
more attention than those that are not self-
sufficient (e.g. Otero and Rhyne 1994). Even non-
profit organizations have begun to identify finan-
cial performance as one of their main goals
(Quayes 2012). At the same time, microfinance
investors base their investment decisions on not
only financial but also social factors (Urgeghe
2010; CGAP 2012). Mainly in response to the
increased commercialization of the industry and
crises hitting several regions, the focus on social
factors has gained importance. Furthermore,
a focus on social factors is crucial to ensure the
future responsibility of the microfinance sector
(Meyer and Krauss 2015). From the perspectives
of both private and institutional investors, the
social return of microfinance institutions – and
the association between social return and financial
performance – are thus increasingly of interest.
Nevertheless, fund managers of commercial
microfinance investment vehicles still do not
strongly emphasize the inclusion of social factors
in their investment decision processes. Several
impediments are identified, including the belief
that microfinance is social ‘per se’, the lack of
standardization in the measurement of social per-
formance, and lax regulation (Urgeghe 2012).
To date, it is not clear how financial and
social factors interact in microfinance. One rea-
son for this uncertainty is that the definition of
social performance includes many different
facets beyond the resulting impact. The diversity
behind the concept of social performance in
microfinance can be illustrated using the so-
called social performance pathway, which differ-
entiates five dimensions of social performance:
Intent & design, internal systems & activities,
outputs, outcomes, and impact (see the Social
Performance Task Force1). Whereas the first two
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dimensions look at processes and strategies of
the microfinance institutions, ‘outputs’ evaluates
the type of client that is reached with the pro-
duct offering. The outcome of microfinance ser-
vices aims to capture the social and economic
improvements of the clients. Impact analyses try
to assess whether those improvements can be
specifically attributed to microfinance services
and therefore focus on the question if microfi-
nance services help to reduce poverty and
improve the living standards of marginalized
households and communities (Morduch 1999;
Khandker 2005; Islam 2009). Nevertheless, the
causal association between microfinance and
social impact in terms of poverty reduction,
employment generation and entrepreneurship
has not been proven (Armendáriz and
Morduch 2010; Duvendack and Palmer-Jones
2011; Roodman 2012; Angelucci, Karlan, and
Zinman 2015; Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman
2015).2
The largest stream of research on the potential
trade-offs between financial and social factors
looks at the output aspect of social performance.
Microfinance output is approximated using mea-
sures of outreach by evaluating the numbers and
types of clients that are reached by the services.
Existing studies that focus on the relation between
output measures and financial performance have
not produced consistent results. We hypothesize
that different results are driven by conceptual
questions concerning the definition of financial
performance. Studies on financial performance
focus on different financial return measures (e.g.
return on assets, return on equity; financial and
operational sustainability), on indicators of effi-
ciency (cost indicators), or on yield measures
(interest rates).
The main contribution of this paper is therefore
to rearrange the logic of the interaction between
social outreach and financial performance and to
disentangle the components of the financial return
measure. The fact that the direction of the inter-
action between financial performance measures is
not unidimensional needs to be addressed. As at
other financial institutions, the return figures of
MFIs are driven by yield (in general, positively)
and operating expenses (in general, negatively).
Consistent with other quantitative empirical ana-
lyses of microfinance, we use measures of depth of
outreach as proxies for social return. We focus on
two particular outreach measures: percentage of
female clients and average loan distributed (in
relation to GNI per capita). We benefit from
a unique panel data set, which includes 1,805
observations on MFIs between 2004 and 2013,
and we analyze the interaction between the two
outreach measures and different proxies for finan-
cial return (portfolio yield, costs and return).
We develop four models to assess the relation
between social outreach and four different finan-
cial performance measures and empirically test the
models within our extensive data set. This
approach enables us to compare findings across
different financial return measures, and therefore
to provide empirical evidence for our expectation
that inconsistent findings on the relation between
outreach and financial performance are mainly
driven by conceptual differences in research
designs. We complete the analysis by running
tests for the different types of MFIs separately to
cope with the heterogeneous MFI universe cov-
ered in the data set.
II. Literature review
The increasing interest in financial performance
among microfinance institutions has led to the criti-
cism that they might abandon their original mission
of serving the very poor, who are excluded from
standard financial services (Drake and Rhyne 2002;
Copestake 2007). This criticism is based on the expec-
tation that higher financial performance comes at the
cost of lower social outreach (Armendáriz and
Morduch 2010).
The discussion of the so-called ‘mission drift’ phe-
nomenon in microfinance has further highlighted the
importance of empirically assessing the potential
trade-off between financial profit and outreach.
Nevertheless, as noted above, existing research on
the interaction between social outreach and financial
return has not yielded consistent results. We have
2Impact studies attempt to measure the direct effects of microfinance in the markets by using different qualitative or quantitative approaches, (quasi-)
experimental studies or (non-) randomized trials.
2 J. MEYER
identified three streams of literature focusing on dif-
ferent measures of financial performance in relation
to social outreach. The first set of papers concentrates
on return measures, such as financial or operational
sustainability or return on assets. The second stream
looks at cost measures; and for the third stream,
concentrating on interest rates and yield measures,
we only find two papers.
Quayes (2012) divides a sample of 702 MFIs
into high- and low-disclosure MFIs based on
their data and information disclosure levels.
Looking at return measures, he finds a positive
relation between financial sustainability3 and
depth of outreach (using average loan balance
divided by GNI per capita) for high-disclosure
MFIs. Furthermore, the author confirms the
result, also for high-disclosure MFIs, by calculat-
ing a logit model using financial sustainability as
the dependent variable and endorsing that a lower
average loan balance per borrower increases the
probability of achieving financial sustainability.
Quayes (2015) also finds a positive relation
between the depth of outreach (average loan bal-
ance) and financial performance (return on assets
and profit margins) using a two-stage least squares
method. The author uses an instrumental variable
in order to overcome the risk of endogeneity by
including average loan balance in the regression,
which might be correlated with the error term.
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2007) do
not find a significant relationship between profit-
ability and average loan balance when using finan-
cial self-sufficiency (FSS)4 as the main measure of
profitability and when using ROA and OSS for
robustness checks. They find that larger loans
imply lower average costs for both individual-
based and solidarity-group lenders. Village banks
are found to face the highest costs and subsidy
levels, while individual-based lenders earn the
highest profits with lower levels of outreach.
Their analysis is based on data on 124 institutions
in 49 developing countries.
Abdullah and Quayes (2016) look at the pro-
portion of female clients as a measure of the depth
of outreach and find that MFIs serving more
female borrowers have significantly better
financial performance (measured through portfo-
lio yield, profit margin, return on assets, and
operational self-sufficiency). They find evidence
that this increase in financial return is linked to
a decline in the portfolio at risk and therefore,
better repayment performance, of female clients.
Paxton (2003) creates a poverty outreach mea-
sure that includes depth of outreach and scale. She
finds that MFIs organized as banks and credit
unions serve a large number of clients below the
poverty level. Furthermore, she measures a zero –
or even negative – relationship between reliance
on subsidies and depth of outreach, indicating that
financially self-sufficient MFIs reach out to the
largest number of poor people.
At the same time, researchers find that more
socially oriented procedures incur higher costs
(Conning 1999; Paxton 2003; Cull, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Morduch 2007; Hermes, Lensink, and
Meesters 2011). Hermes, Lensink, and Meesters
(2011) show evidence of a negative relationship
between efficiency and depth of outreach, mea-
sured as the percentage of female borrowers and
average loan balance. Their analysis is based on
the interaction between efficiency and social
return, using data on more than 1,300 MFIs. The
authors use stochastic frontier analysis to examine
whether there is a trade-off between outreach and
efficiency for MFIs.
In a third approach, which looks at yield mea-
sures, Conning (1999) finds that institutions dis-
tributing smaller loans charge higher interest rates
on average. The author differentiates between low-
end microfinance lending organizations (MFOs),
which serve clients with loans that are – on aver-
age – less than 20% of GNP per capita, and high-
end MFOs, with loans exceeding 85% of GNP per
capita, on average. MFOs in between the two
categories are defined as the broad-end group. In
a sample of 72 institutions, staff expenses per
average loan at low-end MFOs are reported to be
more than three times higher than average. He
also finds that low- and broad-end MFOs charge
interest rates that are, on average, approximately
twice as high as those charged by high-end MFOs.
The reason for the higher interest rates is assumed
3Financial sustainability is here defined as OSS>100% and takes the value 1 if OSS is greater than or equal to 100%, and 0 otherwise.
4FSS measures the extent to which MFIs are able to cover their costs (considering adjustments) and is calculated by dividing adjusted revenue by total
expenses adjusted for subsidies and inflation (Rosenberg 2009).
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to be the intention to cover higher costs. Finally,
low- and broad-end MFOs are shown to have
lower levels of leverage.
Di Bella (2011) analyses factors influencing
interest rates in an empirical investigation. He
shows that interest rate levels are positively influ-
enced by the MFI’s borrowing rates and inversely
related to the average loan balance and the age of
the MFI (Di Bella 2011).
To conclude, a number of studies provide evi-
dence on the relationship between social outreach
and financial performance. Nevertheless, the stu-
dies focus on different aspects of financial perfor-
mance, and therefore, it is not possible to compare
their outcomes.
This paper contributes to the existing literature
in two important ways: First, we try to solve the
puzzle of conflicting evidence created by existing
papers. To our knowledge, it is the first paper that
looks at the mechanisms of existing research pro-
jects, and discusses the aspects covered, the mea-
sures used, and the different outcomes resulting.
Based on the findings, we test four empirical
models and run regression analyses accounting
for the four different types of financial return
measures identified within the same data set. In
a second step, we differentiate the results accord-
ing to categories of MFIs in order to account for
their heterogeneity.
III. Materials and methods
Hypotheses
In this section, we develop three hypotheses based
on theoretical foundations in combination with
empirical evidence (see Figure 1 for an overview
of the hypotheses).
In line with the arguments of neoclassical econ-
omists, smaller loan sizes cause higher total costs
for the institution and therefore reduce profits.
While microfinance institutions are able to con-
duct social outreach by offering small loans and
reaching out to very poor clients, they incur
higher costs. The unit transaction costs of small
loans to the very poor are high compared to the
costs of larger loans. Furthermore, MFIs use very
costly loan monitoring and control techniques as
substitutes for absent standard collaterals
(Conning 1999). Similarly, for female clients,
costs are expected to be higher, mainly because
poorer borrowers (among them more female bor-
rowers) are often reached via group-lending tech-
niques and served using close monitoring and
control techniques, which implies lower efficiency
(Hermes, Lensink, and Meesters 2011).
This hypothesis has been confirmed in a variety
of empirical analyses (Conning 1999; Paxton 2003;
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2007;
Hermes, Lensink, and Meesters 2011), which pre-
sent evidence that social return (outreach) comes
at lower efficiency:
• Hypothesis 1: Large outreach is positively asso-
ciated with higher costs for the MFI.
The second hypothesis reflects the fact that
microfinance interest rates are a function of
expenses, such as financial expenses (e.g. cost of
funds, capitalization rate), provisioning and operat-
ing expenses, being the key determinant (CGAP
2012). Financial expenses compile interest payments
to investors and funders and are not expected to be
directly linked to outreach to the poor, mainly
because liabilities typically have longer maturities
than assets (Dominicié 2012). The second
Figure 1. Overview of hypotheses.
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component, provisioning expenses, might, in turn,
be related to measures of outreach, as Abdullah and
Quayes (2016) find that female clients show better
repayment performance and therefore, require less
provisioning. This would imply that a larger share of
female clients is related to lower interest rates
charged. Nevertheless, the effect of female clients is
twofold, as the share of female clients is also linked
to higher operating expenses (see hypothesis 1),
which might offset the lower provisioning effect.
Operating expenses are expected to increase
with higher outreach (hypothesis 1) and as they
are the major driver of interest rates charged,
hypothesis 2 follows intuitively (see Figure 1):
• Hypothesis 2: Greater outreach is positively asso-
ciated with higher portfolio yield for the MFI.
Empirical findings by Conning (1999) and Di
Bella (2011) confirm that MFIs providing smaller
average loans charge higher interest rates.
The third hypothesis follows directly from the first
two and is based on the findings of Dam (2008), who
states that various financial measures are diversely
connected to social factors. Financial return, mea-
sured as ROA, ROE or OSS, is positively affected by
portfolio yield and negatively by costs. Confirmation
of hypotheses 1 and 2 would imply that outreach has
a positive relation to both portfolio yield and costs,
and therefore, we expect that the resulting effect on
the financial return is (partially) erased (Figure 1).
The theoretical work by Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) focuses on the equilibrium of credit mar-
kets and argues that the augmentation of interest
rates could squeeze low-risk clients out of the
markets. Following the intuition of the agency
theory, charging higher interest rates increasingly
leads to issues with adverse selection and moral
hazard, resulting in lower repayment rates and
decreased profitability of institutions (see also
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2007). This
means that in the long run, the total profitability
of the institutions could suffer due to lower
demand, but even more so because high-quality
clients would quit borrowing.
We argue that in the short term, neither the effect
of social outreach on costs, nor the effect on yield
dominates, but that the two effects are of similar
size. Furthermore, we do not expect a short-term
effect between the higher interest rates and the quality
of the loan portfolio. These arguments are supported
by the fact that until now, researchers have not found
a significant relationship between financial return,
measured as profitability, and social outreach, mea-
sured through a variety of indicators (Cull, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Morduch 2007; Quayes 2012 and others).
• Hypothesis 3: Outreach is not related to the
financial return of MFIs.
Nevertheless, this expected effect between the
three variables of interest and the subsequent con-
struction of hypothesis 3 entails a simplified view
of the interaction between accounting figures.
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2007), for
example, find that the relationship between port-
folio yield and financial self-sufficiency is not lin-
ear for neither group nor individual lenders. They
argue that at low levels of portfolio yield, institu-
tions are able to increase FSS by charging higher
interest rates; however, this relationship holds
only up to a certain point and only for individual
lenders. We expect that the relationship holds for
the average MFI in our sample, as the threshold of
the interest rate charged is barely exceeded,5 and
most institutions in the sample act as individual
lenders. To specify the results, we additionally
look at the relation between outreach measures
and the profit margin in the empirical analysis.
Variables
As a proxy for costs (hypothesis 1), we use operating
expenses divided by assets (OPEX), as they have
been found to be the most important driver of
differences in total costs between institutions (Cull,
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2009).6 Operating
expenses are the best indicator of the MFI’s effi-
ciency regarding lending operations (Ledgerwood
1999) and therefore an appropriate measure. To
5The average yield in our sample is at 33.9% at a nominal base and 25.4% at a real base, compared to a real gross portfolio yield of around 50%, identified as
a threshold in the paper by Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2007).
6In the dataset used, operating expenses and total expenses strongly correlate (coefficient of 0.92, significant at 1% level). Therefore, the results only differ
marginally if total expenses are included in the analysis instead of operating expenses.
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test the second hypothesis, we take gross portfolio
yield on both a nominal (YIELD) and real (YIELDR)
base. Portfolio yield captures average interest rates at
MFI levels (González 2011).
We use the percentage of female clients and the
average loan balance (gross loan portfolio divided by
the number of active borrowers) of an MFI as mea-
sures of outreach. The proportion of female clients is
taken as a measure of the depth of outreach because
it is assumed that women are likely to be poorer, as
they usually have less access to financial services
(GPFI and IFC 2011). Furthermore, women have
traditionally been excluded from decisions related
to finance at the household level, and they often lack
access to financial services (Ledgerwood 1999).
Among investors and donors, the average size of
the loan is commonly used as a second proxy for an
MFI’s outreach to the poor (Armendáriz and
Morduch 2010). Poorer clients tend to request smal-
ler loans, and therefore, this second variable is
a good proxy for outreach to the poor. However,
the average loan balance is difficult to use as
a standardized measure because it very much
depends on the economic situation of a particular
region. Therefore, we adopt an improved, standar-
dized measure by using the average loan balance per
borrower in relation to the average Gross National
Income (GNI) per capita. Also, the share of female
clients can be criticized for not being a perfect sub-
stitute for outreach, as, for example, there might be
other reasons – beyond having a more social atti-
tude – that could force or motivate an institution to
serve more or fewer women (e.g. religious or ethical
context (Urgeghe 2010)). However, data on other
social performance indicators are not available for
such a large set of MFIs over such a long period.
Furthermore, it is the aim of this paper to solve the
puzzle of existing research, and it is therefore impor-
tant to use the same performance measures.
Because most MFIs are not publicly listed,
accounting indicators such as return on assets
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), and efficiency mea-
sures must be used as indicators for financial perfor-
mance to test the third hypothesis (Tchakoute-
Tchuigoua 2010; Galema, Lensink, and Spierdijk
2011). Both ROA and ROE are widely used to
measure the performance of banks and companies,
as well as microfinance institutions (Ledgerwood
1999). OSS reflects the performance of institutions
before subsidies. Subsidies are usually provided in
the form of grants or loans at interest rates below
market rates. It is likely that some institutions would
not be able to maintain their performance without
subsidies (Rosenberg 2009). OSS measures the
degree towhich operational income covers expenses.
We further use profit margin, as a measure of the
relation between the net operating income (YIELD-
OPEX) divided by operating revenue (YIELD)
(CGAP/The World Bank Group 2003).
Empirical model
To estimate the model, we pool cross-sectional
data on MFIs for the years 2004 to 2013, resulting
in an unbalanced panel dataset.7
To test the three hypotheses developed above,
we estimate the following three regression models:
Model 1:
OPEXit ¼ β0 þ β1FEMALEit þ β2ALB GNIit
þ β3SIZEit þ β4AGEit þ β5PAR30it
þ β6LEVERAGEit þ β711LEGALi
þ β1216REGIONiþ1722YEARt þ εit
Model 2:
YIELDit=YIELDRit ¼ β0 þ β1FEMALEit
þ β2ALB GNIit þ β3SIZEit




þ β1722YEARt þ εit
Model 3:
ROAit=ROEit=OSSit ¼ β0 þ β1FEMALEit
þ β2ALB GNIit þ β3SIZEit




þ β1722YEARt þ εit
7Using an unbalanced dataset rather than a balanced one has the advantage of representing the market more effectively by including all MFIs and
preventing survivorship bias (see Baum 2006).
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The three models reflect the hypotheses devel-
oped above, whereas the relevant dependent vari-
ables used, and the predicted signs of the
coefficients, differ. Outreach is measured based
on two variables (female and average loan balance
in relation to GNI), whereas the two expected
effects are opposite, as average loan is an inverse
measure of outreach.
To test our results based on the dependent
variables defined above, we use an additional
model specification using the profit margin as
the dependent variable:
Model 4:
MARGINit ¼ β0 þ β1FEMALEit þ β2ALB GNIit
þ β3SIZEit þ β4AGEit þ β5PAR30it
þ β6LEVERAGEit þ β711LEGALi
þ β1216REGIONi þ β1722YEARt þ εit
To control for other effects that might influence
the relationship between social and financial return,
we include several control variables. The SIZE of an
institution has often been found to correlate with
performance measures (Barnett and Salomon 2006;
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2007;
Zacharias 2008). We include PAR30 to control for
different risk structures by measuring the share of
the portfolio with payments overdue by more than
30 days.8 The debt-to-equity ratio (LEVERAGE) is
included as a control for different financing struc-
tures that could influence financial performance
(Conning 1999; Kyereboah-Coleman 2007; Quayes
2012). To control for the structural characteristics
of MFIs, we define the following fixed effects for
legal status (LEGAL): BANK, COOP (credit union/
cooperative), NGO (non-governmental organiza-
tion), OTHER, RURBANK (rural bank) and NBFI
(non-banking financial institution). For regional
fixed effects (REGION), we include dummies for
Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin
America and the Caribbean, Middle East and
North Africa, South Asia, East Asia and Pacific
(Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2007).9
As panel data are collected at different points in
time, this analysis includes more than one observa-
tion per MFI. Consequently, the assumptions of
underlying OLS-estimators may not be met,
which might result in inconsistent estimators
(Petersen 2009; Green 2012). One way to counter
the potential for biased estimators is the use of
random effects models. The random effects model
is based on the assumption that the observations
for one MFI tend to be related to each other over
time, to a greater extent than the relations among
different MFIs (Petersen 2009). Unobserved indivi-
dual heterogeneity is therefore assumed to be
uncorrelated with the variables that are included.
Another way to handle panel data is the use of
fixed effects models. Using fixed effects is appropri-
ate when it is expected that an effect varies over time
and therefore needs to be estimated using dummy
variables (measuring a group-specific constant
term) (Wooldridge 2003; Green 2012). To decide
which of the two models to use, we run
a Hausman test (Green 2012). The null hypothesis
states that the random effects model is preferred,
while the alternative hypothesis favours the fixed
effects model. This means that the null hypothesis
does not expect the unique errors to be correlated
with the regressors. In this study, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis, andwe decide to use the random
effects model (results available in Table 1 for the
variable YIELD as a dependent variable).
For the use of a random effects model, the correla-
tion between the explanatory variables and the error
term needs to be zero to ensure that the explanatory
variables are exogenous. Because we cannot exclude
the possibility that some unobservable effects are cor-
related with individual-level random effects we use an
Table 1. Hausman test: random effects versus fixed effects for
YIELD.
Coefficients
VARIABLES (b) fixed (B) random (b-B) Difference S.E.
FEMALE .0897749 .1044441 −.0146692 .013335
ALB_GNI −.0312396 −.0334542 .0022146 .0026273
SIZE −.0102305 −.0126325 .0024019 .0029797
PAR30 −.0296036 −.0406403 .0110367 .0106251
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg




8We also analyze the write-off ratio as a control, but the results remain stable, and as the focus here is not on risk measures, only PAR30 is included in the
main regression.
9The consideration of multiple dummy variables (LEGAL, REGION, and YEAR) results in different intercepts for each observation, controlling for the various
fixed effects of the particular variables (Wooldridge 2003).
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adjusted version of the random effects model, pro-
posed by Hausman and Taylor (1981). The use of
instrumental variables within the HT model helps to
overcome the potential concern of endogeneity,
which is expected to prevail for the two variables of
interest: FEMALE and ALB_GNI. Instrumental vari-
ables are calculated using the ‘Least Square Dummy
Variable’method, based on the temporal mean of the
variables expected to be related to some unobservable
effects. Our data hold the necessary condition to use
theHTmodel: the number of exogenous time-varying
variables is larger (or equal) than the number of
endogenous time-invariant variables (Hausman and
Taylor 1981).
Data
We use data on MFIs from the Microfinance
Information eXchange database (MIX).10 MFIs
voluntarily participate in the database. MIX does
not check the reliability of each participating
MFI’s data, although it does perform some adjust-
ments to make comparison easier, such as correct-
ing for inflation, loan loss provisioning/write-offs
and subsidies (MIX 2007).
Data collected by MIX are credited with being
the best available representation of the top MFIs in
the microfinance industry (Hartarska and
Nadolnyak 2007; Krauss and Walter 2008; Di
Bella 2011). Furthermore, as the data quality of
the MIX database has often been criticized, MIX
has implemented a rating system, using a scale of
one to five, to indicate the reporting quality and
completeness of the data on MFIs. In order to
receive five diamonds, an MFI needs to publish
audited financial statements on a yearly basis,
accompanied by a rating or due diligence report.11
To ensure that the regression results are not biased
by MFIs with bad reporting standards or missing
information, only MFIs with five diamonds were
included in the present analyses.12 The resulting
data file for the purpose of the regression analysis
includes 1,805 observations between 2004 and
2013, variable descriptions and descriptive statistics
are presented in Tables 2 and 3.
IV. Results
Total sample
The results for the first hypothesis are found in the
HT regression using OPEX13 as the dependent
variable (see column (1) of Table 5).14 The signifi-
cantly positive coefficient for FEMALE and the
significantly negative coefficient for ALB_GNI indi-
cate confirmation of hypothesis 1. Higher outreach
thus comes at the cost of higher operating expenses.
The results are strongly significant at the 1% level,
illustrating a low probability of error. The coeffi-
cient is higher for the variable FEMALE than for
ALB_GNI. Therefore, it seems to be more costly to
increase outreach by targeting female clients than
by reducing the average loan balances. Possible
explanations for higher costs for female clients
could be the increased marketing efforts required
to target them or the development of group-
building techniques in order to meet their require-
ments (Hermes, Lensink, and Meesters 2011).
Evidence is also found to support the second
hypothesis, which states that portfolio yield is posi-
tively correlated to outreach (see columns (2) and
(3) in Table 5). The variable FEMALE shows
a positive coefficient for both nominal (YIELD)
and real yield (YIELDR). The coefficients for both
measures are significantly different from zero at the
1% level (indicated by three stars). The more women
served by an MFI, the higher the portfolio yield. The
value of the coefficient (0.083) implies that institu-
tions serving only female clients request interest
rates that are, on average, 8.3 percentage points
10www.mixmarket.org.
11Four diamonds means that audited financial statements are available with lack of rating/due diligence. An institution receiving three diamonds needs to
have an active profile (one diamond), some data on clients and products for the year (two diamonds) and some financial data for the year (see www.
mixmarket.org/faq/diamond-rankings).
12The decision to exclude all MFIs with less than five diamonds is made because abnormal values reported by several low-diamond MFIs were discovered (for
example, percentage of female customers>100%). Additionally, MFIs reporting negative levels of leverage (18 observations), and one observation with
a leverage of over 2,000, were excluded.
13To be very consistent, we also test the hypothesis using an adjusted measure of OPEX, putting operating expenses in relation to total portfolio, rather than
total assets. The reasoning behind this test is that portfolio yield is computed in relation to the portfolio, while OPEX is based on total assets. The test led
to similarly significant but larger coefficients for both variables of outreach, which intuitively makes sense, as the new OPEX variable is larger due to the
smaller denominator (portfolio versus total assets).
14We also present results using the random effects and the pooled OLS model, see Table 4.
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higher than the rates that a hypothetical institution
serving only male customers would charge. One
reason for this could be that women accept higher
prices for loans because they face more difficulties
with regard to financial access in general.
The results are also in favour of hypothesis 2
based on the coefficient of ALB_GNI (average loan
balance divided by GNI per capita) in relation to
YIELD and YIELDR, which is significantly negative
at the 1% level. Therefore, the lower the average loan
balance divided by GNI per capita (that is, the more
outreach achieved), the higher the portfolio yield for
a given MFI. However, the value of the coefficient is
rather small, indicating that an increase in the
average loan balance in relation toGNI of 10 percen-
tage points leads to a reduction in the yield by
0.3 percentage points. On average, higher prices
are charged on smaller loans, which confirms the
expectation that MFIs try to cover the higher costs
incurred for smaller loans. Cross-subsidization
between smaller and larger loans does, so far, not
seem to occur to a significant extent.
The analysis supports the third hypothesis, based
on the outreach variable ALB_GNI as we find no
significant relationship between ROA, ROE andOSS
and ALB_GNI (see columns (4) (5) and (6) of Table
5). The effect between FEMALE and the return
variable ROA is similar to the effect on the yields,
as the coefficient is positive and significant at the 5%
level. The outreach measure FEMALE, therefore,
shows a tendency to be slightly positively correlated
with financial returns, confirming previous findings
on lower default rates of female clients (Abdullah
andQuayes 2016). Taking profit margin (MARGIN)
as a dependent variable, the relation to the two out-
reach variables is in line with the coefficients found
for portfolio yield (column (7) of Table 5). This
points to the fact that the effect between both out-
reach measures and YIELD slightly dominates, the
one with OPEX, as the profit margin is calculated by
Table 2. Variable description.
Dependent Variables
YIELD =Gross yield on portfolio
(nominal) (%)
Gross measure capturing the interest revenues earned by the institutions in relation to the portfolio (nominal)
YIELDR =Gross yield on portfolio
(real) (%)
Gross measure capturing the interest revenues earned by the institutions in relation to the portfolio (real)
OPEX =Operating expenses of
MFI (%)
Operating expenses in relation to total assets
ROA =Return on assets (%) Return divided by total assets
ROE =Return on equity (%) Return divided by equity
OSS =Operational self-
sufficiency (%)
Degree to which operational income covers expenses
MARGIN =Profit margin (%) Net operating income divided by operating revenue
Explanatory Variables
FEMALE =Percentage of female
clients (%)
Percentage of females that are served by MFI
ALB_GNI =Average loan balance
(%)
Average loan balance distributed by MFI in relation to GNI per Capita
Control Variables
SIZE =Size of the MFI Natural logarithm of total assets of MFI
AGE =Age of the MFI Years since foundation of the MFI
PAR30 =Portfolio at risk,
30 days (%)
Percentage of loans overdue more than 30 days
LEVERAGE =Leverage of the MFI Debt-to-equity ratio divided by 100
LEGAL =Legal Status of the MFI Vector of dummy variables indicating legal status of the MFI: Bank (BANK), credit union/cooperative (COOP), non-
governmental organization (NGO), other (OTHER), rural bank (RURBANK), non-banking financial institution (NBFI,
excluded as base)
REGION =Regional location of
the MFI
Vector of dummy variables indicating regional location of the MFI: Africa (AFRICA), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin
America and the Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA), East Asia and the Pacific (EAP, excluded as
base)
Time FE =Year fixed effects Dummy variable for each year from 2005 to 2013, taking 2004 as base
and i = MFI, t = Year
Table 3. Descriptive statistics.
VARIABLE OBS. MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX
YIELD 1,805 33.75% 17.23% 4.40% 188.36%
YIELDR 1,805 25.16% 17.26% −22.40% 178.89%
OPEX 1,805 17.57% 12.04% 1.00% 150.15%
ROA 1,805 2.81% 8.23% −101.26% 45.00%
ROE 1,805 12.11% 89.84% −1286.19% 1791.28%
OSS 1,805 121.92% 41.26% 13.32% 833.88%
MARGIN 1,805 10.49% 35.65% −650.83% 86.00%
FEMALE 1,805 63.28% 24.56% 1.00% 100.00%
ALB 1,805 1203.08 1808.69 5.01 36,954.30
ALB_GNI 1,805 56.68% 74.68% 0.28% 773.33%
SIZE 1,805 16.45 1.75 11.85 21.77
PAR30 1,805 4.50% 6.87% 0.00% 94.75%
LEVERAGE 1,805 5.11 13.05 0 302.56
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dividing net operating income (YIELD-OPEX) by
YIELD. This finding is also reflected in the positive
relation between FEMALE and ROA andmeans that
the expectation that the effects on YIELD andOPEX
are of similar size needs to be scrutinized.
We, therefore, take a closer look at the data by
generating a combination of the two variables
FEMALE and ALB_GNI representing the level of
outreach (low outreach, medium outreach and
high outreach):
Results in Figure 2 show average values of the
different dependent variables of interest for the
three levels of outreach defined above. YIELD and
OPEX increase with the level of outreach. The
increase of the revenue measure (YIELD) is slightly
stronger than the growth of operating expenses
(OPEX), resulting in a slightly increasing average
difference between the two measures with higher
levels of outreach. This indicates that operating
expenses are overcompensated by interest rates
charged at higher levels of outreach. As a result,
the profit margin (MARGIN) increases with out-
reach. Interestingly, the relation with the two out-
reach variables is only significant in the HT model,
but not using a standard OLS regression or random
effects method (see Table 4). The relation with the
variable FEMALE is even negative (not at
a significant level) in the standard OLS regression.
This points to the fact that the relation between
outreach and MARGIN seems not to be as strong
as the relation with the other dependent variables.
ROA and OSS are on average constant over
different levels of outreach, and ROE reaches its
peak at medium outreach. These descriptive
results thus clearly support the three hypotheses
defined above and provide evidence for the expec-
tation that more outreach involves higher yield
Table 4. Outreach and financial performance: random effects and pooled ols using data from 2004 to 2013 (453 MFIs).
Random Effects Pooled OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OPEX YIELD YIELDR OPEX YIELD YIELDR
FEMALE 0.058*** 0.092*** 0.069*** 0.090*** 0.143*** 0.137***
(4.033) (4.476) (3.098) (3.560) (3.379) (3.317)
ALB_GNI −0.013*** −0.033*** −0.031*** −0.025*** −0.046*** −0.048***
(−3.535) (−6.210) (−5.413) (−4.589) (−4.029) (−4.588)
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included
Time FE Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 0.745*** 0.579*** 0.551*** 0.553*** 0.589*** 0.439***
(19.957) (10.801) (9.784) (7.472) (6.264) (4.711)
Observations 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805
z-statistics in parentheses robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
VARIABLES ROA ROE OSS MARGIN ROA ROE OSS MARGIN
FEMALE 0.024* 0.077 −0.012 0.023 0.017 0.085 −0.033 −0.046
(1.736) (0.620) (−0.174) (0.388) (1.241) (1.411) (−0.508) (−0.892)
ALB_GNI −0.002 −0.006 0.008 −0.022 0.017 0.085 −0.033 −0.009
(−0.635) (−0.180) (0.417) (−1.366) (1.241) (1.411) (−0.508) (−0.547)
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Time FE Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant −0.221*** −0.628** 0.823*** −1.074*** −0.098* −0.630 0.906*** −0.547**
(−6.523) (−2.129) (5.079) (−7.650) (−1.851) (−1.225) (5.683) (−2.406)
Observations 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805
z-statistics in parentheses robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
The dependent variables in this Table are the following: OPEX is operating expenses in relation to total assets; yield on portfolio nominal/real (YIELD/R) is the
interest and fee income divided by the average loan portfolio; ROA and ROE are returns in relation to total assets and equity, respectively; OSS (operational
self-sufficiency) is the degree to which operational income covers expenses, and MARGIN is the profit margin (net operating income divided by operating
revenue). The two most important explanatory variables with respect to the Hypotheses are the percentage of female borrowers (FEMALE) and the average
loan balance in relation to the GNI per capita (ALB_GNI). All explanatory variables are used as defined above.
FEMALE low FEMALE high
ALB_GNI
low
Medium Outreach High Outreach
(FEMALE below 25. percentile;
ALB_GNI below 25.
percentile)





Low Outreach Medium Outreach
(FEMALE below 25. percentile;
ALB_GNI above 75.
percentile)




and higher costs at the same time at a marginal
resulting effect on return measures.
With regards to the control variables, we find that
the size of the institution (measured using the
natural logarithmof total assets), is negatively related
to both YIELD and OPEX, but at the same time
positively linked to all returnmeasures and the profit
margin. This means that larger institutions can
Table 5. Outreach and financial performance: Hausman Taylor regression using data from 2004 to 2013 (453 MFIs).
VARIABLES (1) OPEX (2) YIELD (3) YIELDR (4) ROA (5) ROE (6) OSS (7) MARGIN
FEMALE 0.054*** 0.083*** 0.047* 0.042** −0.038 0.134 0.150*
(3.455) (3.611) (1.786) (2.354) (−0.131) (1.193) (1.788)
ALB_GNI −0.010*** −0.031*** −0.028*** −0.006 0.010 0.014 −0.044**
(−2.757) (−5.490) (−4.355) (−1.327) (0.140) (0.521) (−2.134)
SIZE −0.045*** −0.013*** −0.017*** 0.024*** 0.085*** 0.051*** 0.155***
(−17.463) (−3.537) (−4.254) (9.465) (3.467) (4.247) (12.692)
PAR30 −0.002 −0.024 0.008 −0.185*** −0.137 −0.763*** −0.630***
(−0.095) (−0.665) (0.202) (−6.750) (−0.371) (−4.860) (−4.860)
LEVERAGE 0.026** −0.011 0.007 −0.067*** 0.289 −0.165** −0.249***
(2.317) (−0.666) (0.394) (−5.333) (1.617) (−2.218) (−4.206)
BANK −0.030 −0.050* −0.042 −0.031* 0.018 −0.087 −0.166*
(−1.383) (−1.771) (−1.437) (−1.744) (0.128) (−1.195) (−1.908)
COOP −0.064*** −0.118*** −0.107*** −0.002 0.051 −0.004 0.020
(−2.830) (−3.980) (−3.604) (−0.128) (0.381) (−0.064) (0.229)
NGO −0.017 −0.010 −0.018 0.022* 0.161* 0.075 0.106*
(−1.089) (−0.472) (−0.848) (1.797) (1.787) (1.572) (1.725)
OTHER 0.034 0.019 0.005 0.030 −0.007 0.152 0.107
(0.222) (0.101) (0.029) (0.273) (−0.009) (0.386) (0.198)
RURBANK −0.177*** −0.105 −0.119 0.061 0.326 0.136 0.348
(−2.980) (−1.387) (−1.586) (1.378) (0.910) (0.780) (1.596)
AFRICA 0.065** 0.021 −0.006 −0.021 −0.079 −0.143* −0.122
(2.272) (0.587) (−0.166) (−0.989) (−0.527) (−1.827) (−1.183)
ECA −0.003 −0.026 −0.053* 0.019 0.010 0.030 0.026
(−0.134) (−0.811) (−1.660) (1.017) (0.067) (0.409) (0.282)
LAC 0.049** 0.002 0.025 −0.008 −0.026 −0.094 −0.122
(2.042) (0.077) (0.815) (−0.471) (−0.198) (−1.372) (−1.372)
MENA 0.011 −0.058 −0.027 −0.020 −0.129 −0.062 −0.224
(0.267) (−1.149) (−0.541) (−0.690) (−0.659) (−0.585) (−1.563)
SA −0.073*** −0.144*** −0.150*** −0.031 0.116 −0.148* −0.175*
(−2.637) (−4.055) (−4.266) (−1.469) (0.680) (−1.776) (−1.707)
Time FE Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 0.846*** 0.572*** 0.582*** −0.345*** −0.981** 0.447** −2.212***
(19.853) (9.575) (9.035) (−8.302) (−2.107) (2.151) (−11.103)
Observations 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
The dependent variables in this table are the following: OPEX is operating expenses in relation to total assets; yield on portfolio nominal/real (YIELD/R) is the
interest and fee income divided by the average loan portfolio; ROA and ROE are returns in relation to total assets and equity, respectively; OSS (operational
self-sufficiency) is the degree to which operational income covers expenses, and MARGIN is the profit margin (net operating income divided by operating
revenue). The two most important explanatory variables with respect to the Hypotheses are the percentage of female borrowers (FEMALE) and the average
loan balance in relation to the GNI per capita (ALB_GNI). All explanatory variables are used as defined above. The following independent exogenous
variables are time-invariant: OTHER, RURBANK, AFRICA, ECA, LAC, MENA, SA. The following independent exogenous variables are time-variant: SIZE, PAR30,
LEVERAGE, BANK, COOP, NGO.
Figure 2. Comparison of variables in relation to levels of outreach.
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benefit from economies of scale by reducing operat-
ing expenses (and potentially other types of
expenses), and therefore achieving better overall
financial performance. The portfolio quality mea-
sured with the portfolio at risk (30 days) is signifi-
cantly negatively related to the return measures and
the profit margin. For the different types of legal
status and regional allocation, we do not find sub-
stantial differences in the dependent variables, except
that cooperatives seem to incur lower expenses
(OPEX) and charge lower interest rates (YIELD/R).
Overall, results for this data set provide support
for two hypotheses for both outreach measures,
and partial acceptance of the third hypothesis,
even when controlling for a large set of variables.15
Robustness checks16
Although we include several control variables in the
model, it is possible that some correlated variables are
omitted. This omission would lead to biased test
results. One example is that MFIs located in rural
areas serve poorer clients while charging higher inter-
est rates. This situation means that both variables are
influenced by the regional allocation of the institution.
Other than that, themission of a particularMFI or the
obligations imposed by donors or investors could lead
to serving poorer clients at higher prices. Also, the
management quality or the quality of human
resources might influence both the dependent and
the independent variables at the same time. To test
for possibly omitted variables, we use a form of a fixed
effects model and include 452 dummy variables in the
regression, accounting for all MFIs and using one as
the reference group. The inclusion of a dummy vari-
able perMFI allows different intercepts for each insti-
tution (Wooldridge 2003). By monitoring the
unobserved heterogeneity among MFIs, the dummy
variables control for all the time-constant, unobserva-
ble characteristics of the MFIs that could affect the
dependent variable (Wooldridge 2003). This is a very
strong test, which controls for all the characteristics of
the single MFIs that could influence the relationship
between the independent and the dependent
variables.
Regarding OPEX, the effect of social return
remains statistically significant for both outreach
variables. Both coefficients increase for OPEX,
with FEMALE slightly increasing from 0.054 to
0.059 and ALB_GNI from −0.010 to −0.011, indi-
cating that no institution-specific variable influ-
ences both the explanatory factors and the
dependent variable OPEX at the same time.
With regard to hypothesis 2 (with YIELD as
a dependent variable), the value of both coefficients
is constant when institutional fixed effects are
included (see Table 6). The positive relationship
between social performance and nominal yield per-
sists with strong statistical significance at the 1%
level, even after the inclusion of fixed effects.
The effect for the real yield is only weakly
significant at the 10% level in the fixed effects
model for the variable FEMALE, while the coef-
ficient for ALB_GNI remains strongly signifi-
cant. However, the coefficients were already
smaller for real than for nominal yield in the
random effects HT regression. This could indi-
cate that if MFIs adjust interest rates according
to the characteristics of the client or the loan
size, they do it on a nominal level, not by con-
sidering the national price level.
The coefficients of ROE and OSS remain statisti-
cally insignificant as in the original model, meaning
that hypothesis 3 is again confirmed, even when
taking unobservable effects into account. The coeffi-
cient of FEMALE in the model with ROA as depen-
dent variable slightly decreases after the inclusion of
fixed effects and remains only weakly significant.
This indicates that part of the relationship between
ROA and FEMALE is erased through other factors
influencing both variables.
The level of significance of the effects for the depen-
dent variableMARGINdecrease when controlling for
institutional fixed effects (for ALB_GNI) or comple-
tely disappear (for FEMALE). This result confirms
our expectation that the relationship between
15When including all MFIs in the analysis, without controlling for the number of diamonds, the results for hypotheses 1 and 2 remain significant. The
regression estimation contains 6,116 observations and leads to similar coefficients, significant at the 1% level. Regarding ROE and OSS, small differences
result when all diamonds are included. ROE is positively influenced by FEMALE, significant at the 5% level, and OSS is positively connected to ALB_GNI
(significant at the 5% level), indicating that lower outreach involves higher values of OSS. However, as stated above, some MFIs with low diamond scores
report implausible results, and these scarcely significant results are therefore probably not valid.
16In addition to the regression diagnostic tests presented here, more tests have been conducted (multicollinearity (variance inflation factors), control for
outliers, inclusion of all MFIs regardless of their number of diamonds, and so forth) and are available upon request.
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outreach and profit margin is not substantial and
probably driven by other unobservable factors.
Not surprisingly, the R-squared increased strongly
to between 36% and 90% in all models. By including
dummies for eachMFIwe are able to capturemuch of
the variation in the dependent variable.
To conclude, all the hypotheses are confirmed
with strong significance, even when controlling
for all institution-specific fixed factors.
Another issue that requires attention is the sig-
nificant negative correlation between the two
explanatory variables of interest: FEMALE and
ALB_GNI. Therefore, we run the HT model with
Table 7. Outreach and financial performance: Hausman Taylor regression for FEMALE and ALB_GNI separately using data from 2004
to 2013 (453 MFIs).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OPEX OPEX YIELD YIELD ROA ROA
FEMALE 0.058*** 0.097*** 0.045**
(3.770) (4.218) (2.526)
ALB_GNI −0.012*** −0.033*** −0.007
(−3.142) (−5.913) (−1.611)
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included
Time FE Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 0.839*** 0.889*** 0.555*** 0.642*** −0.31*** −0.310***
(19.679) (21.827) (9.200) (11.272) (−8.021) (−8.021)
Observations 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805
z-statistics in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES ROE ROE OSS OSS MARGIN MARGIN
FEMALE −0.043 0.127 0.171**
(−0.153) (1.135) (2.047)
ALB_GNI 0.011 0.010 −0.048**
(0.159) (0.371) (−2.356)
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included
Time FE Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant −0.979** −0.624** −0.979** 0.57*** −2.236*** −1.02***
(−2.103) (−2.418) (−2.103) (3.180) (−11.217) (−2.723)
Observations 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805
z-statistics in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
The dependent variables in this table are the following: OPEX is operating expenses in relation to total assets; yield on portfolio nominal/real (YIELD/R) is the
interest and fee income divided by the average loan portfolio; ROA and ROE are returns in relation to total assets and equity, respectively, OSS (operational
self-sufficiency) is the degree to which operational income covers expenses, and MARGIN is the profit margin (net operating income divided by operating
revenue). The two most important explanatory variables with respect to the Hypotheses are the percentage of female borrowers (FEMALE) and the average
loan balance in relation to the GNI per capita (ALB_GNI). All explanatory variables are used as defined above.
Table 6. Outreach and financial performance: institutional (MFI) fixed effects included.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES OPEX YIELD YIELDR ROA ROE OSS MARGIN
Institution Fixed
Effects
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
FEMALE 0.059*** 0.084*** 0.050* 0.036* 0.091 0.108 0.112
(3.639) (3.547) (1.833) (1.914) (0.297) (0.907) (1.233)
ALB_GNI −0.011*** −0.031*** −0.028*** −0.005 −0.007 0.025 −0.038*
(−2.880) (−5.339) (−4.247) (−1.051) (−0.100) (0.853) (−1.693)
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Time FE Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 0.892*** 0.867*** 0.754*** −0.163** −1.270 1.501*** −2.113***
(13.369) (8.850) (6.731) (−2.086) (−1.004) (3.058) (−5.610)
Observations 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805
R-squared 0.900 0.895 0.863 0.709 0.358 0.542 0.639
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
The dependent variables in this table are the following: OPEX is operating expenses in relation to total assets; Yield on portfolio nominal/real (YIELD/R) is the
interest and fee income divided by the average loan portfolio; ROA and ROE are returns in relation to total assets and equity, respectively, OSS (operational
self-sufficiency) is the degree to which operational income covers expenses, and MARGIN is the profit margin (net operating income divided by operating
revenue). The two most important explanatory variables with respect to the Hypotheses are the percentage of female borrowers (FEMALE) and the average
loan balance in relation to the GNI per capita (ALB_GNI). All explanatory variables are used as defined above.
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the two variables separately (see Table 7), control-
ling for the same factors as in the model defined
above. We find the same results for the two sepa-
rate models, with an almost identical size of coef-
ficients and equal level of significance, and can,
therefore, accept all the hypotheses based on the
individual regression results.
Different types of MFIs
As the database by MIX used in this paper
includes a large set of heterogeneous MFIs, we
differentiate our general conclusions for specific
categories of MFIs – namely, for institutional
types and geographies. Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Morduch (2007) argue that institutional design
has an influence on trade-offs between return
measures in microfinance. To track conditions
under which our results hold, we differentiate
our findings based on approaches of institutional
classification (Table 8). According to Ledgerwood
(1999), financial service providers can be classified
into three types: informal, semi-formal and formal
institutions. This approach of differentiation is
important in our context as we focus on financial
return measures that are influenced by the type of
formalization (Meyer 2013). Based on the avail-
able data and the fact that the MIX database does
not capture information on informal institutions,
the status of formalization of MFIs can be best
proxied through the differentiation into for-profit
and not-for-profit institutions and according to
the legal status. The results found for the whole
sample all hold if running the analysis separately
for the set of for-profit institutions (banks, non-
bank financial institutions and rural banks) and
for the not-for-profits (which include NGOs,
cooperative societies and credit unions), respec-
tively. Most results found for all MFIs also prevail
if differentiating the sample according to their
regulatory status (Table 8), confirming previous
research that found no effect of regulation on
financial results and outreach (Hartarska and
Nadolnyak 2007). Overall results, therefore, indi-
cate that the type of formal status of the institution
seems not to be a decisive driver of the interaction
between social outreach and financial perfor-
mance. This finding is particularly interesting
because not-for-profit institutions are found to
serve poorer households than for-profits do
(Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2009).
In addition to the institutional setup, idiosyn-
cratic characteristics of the market and competi-
tion both have important implications for an
MFI’s operations. On the one hand, microfinance
industries historically developed differently in the
broad geographical regions, with for instance
group-based and women-focused poverty lending
approaches originating from South Asia, coopera-
tive-type institutions long dominating in countries
of the West African Economic and Monetary
Union and the first transformation of
a microenterprise lending for-profits into a bank
happening in Bolivia. On the other hand, the
option to compensate for higher expenses by aug-
menting prices is driven by the intensity of
Table 8. Results according to the classification of MFIs.
Classification n YIELD YIELDR OPEX ROA ROE OSS
For-profit 996 X X X X X X
Not-for-profit 902 X X (FEM) X X X X
Regulated 1,053 X X X X X X
Not regulated 747 X X (FEM) X (ALB) X (FEM) X X
LAC 738 X X X X X X
ECA 385 X X (FEM) X X X X
MENA 128 X X (ALB) X (ALB) X X (ALB) X
SA 196 X (FEM) X X X (FEM)
EAP 53 X (FEM) X (ALB) X X X
Africa 230 X (ALB) X X X
Small 533 X X (FEM) X X X X
Middle 845 X X X X (ALB) X X
Large 427 X (ALB) X (ALB) X (ALB) X (ALB) X (ALB) X
This table depicts the results of the random effects regression using data from 2004 to 2013 according to different types of classification. Fields
marked with ‘X’ indicate that the results of this specific class are in line with the results for the whole sample found above, meaning that the
findings are also significantly different from zero at the 5% or 1% level. Empty cells indicate that the results diverge from those found in the full
sample. Cells with ‘ALB’ indicate that the results are at a significant level, in line with those found in the full sample, for the independent variable
‘ALB_GNI’ only. Cells with ‘FEM’ indicate that the results are at a significant level, in line with those found in the full sample, for the independent
variable ‘FEMALE’ only.
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competition. Stronger competition should,
according to the structure-conduct-performance
theory (e.g. Weiss 1974), bring interest rates
down in the respective markets. In microfinance,
the relation between competition and pricing is
not necessarily in favour of the borrowers because
with increasing competition, MFIs might start to
distribute multiple loans to impatient borrowers
(McIntosh and Wydick 2005). This behaviour
results in diminishing repayment rates if bor-
rowers apply for multiple loans across different
institutions and MFIs fail to share information
on their borrowers. De Quidt, Fether, and
Ghatak (2016) also show that in competitive mar-
kets, borrowers’ incentives to repay are negatively
affected, as they have access to multiple providers.
The result of increasing competition could, there-
fore, involve less-favourable credit conditions for
all clients. Nevertheless, this condition only holds
as long as MFIs do not share information and
have no access to the credit history of clients,
which changes as soon as official credit bureaus
emerge. In another approach to classification, we,
therefore, consider the regional location of the
institution, following the standard regional classi-
fication of the World Bank group.
The largest number of MFIs in the sample
operate in Latin America and the Caribbean
(LAC), followed by Europe and Central Asia
(ECA). The results for all hypotheses hold if we
look only at MFIs operating in these two regions
separately. For MFIs active in the Middle East and
Northern Africa (MENA), most of the results hold
(though not at a significant level for the variable
FEMALE). Also, confirming the results found
above, data for MFIs active in Africa, South Asia
and East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) indicate no
significant relation between the measures of out-
reach and return (ROA, ROE and OSS).
Nevertheless, in those three regions, the relation
among measures of depth of outreach, costs, and
yield is not in line with the results discussed
above. Operating expenses in all three regions
are not significantly related to either measure of
outreach.
Furthermore, in two regions (Africa and South
Asia), the analysis of the variable ‘FEMALE’ par-
ticularly leads to different results. Both yield mea-
sures are negatively related to female clients,
which means that female clients pay less for their
loans in those regions. Furthermore, in South
Asia, operating expenses are negatively associated
with female clients (not at a significant level).
Nevertheless, the results are probably driven by
the fact that the majority of clients are female in
South Asia (93%), compared to an average across
all data of 63% female clients.
Because the size of the institution (i.e. total
assets) seems to be an important driver of all
dependent variables (see Table 5), we also check
for differences in results according to total assets.
We differentiate three groups (largest: more than
USD 50 Million, middle: between USD 5 and
50 Million, smallest: below USD 5 Million total
assets).17 Whereas the results remain stable for the
two groups of smaller MFIs, the results diverge for
the largest group for the variable FEMALE. In
large institutions, female clients show significantly
larger levels of ROA and ROE. At the same time,
those larger institutions serve fewer female clients
than average (with 53%, compared to the
mean 63%).
Data limitations prevent us from assessing
other important approaches to differentiation.
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2007), for
example, argue that the type of lending methodol-
ogy used is important for return and outreach
considerations; nevertheless, this variable is not
available in our database.
To conclude, the results seem to be robust
across different degrees of formalization of MFIs.
Nevertheless, size and region are important dri-
vers of the relationship. This means that analyses
should ideally be done at a country or even market
level, taking specific conditions, such as competi-
tion, into account. Furthermore, the variable
‘FEMALE’ is, in certain markets, probably not
the best measure of outreach, as some MFIs still
concentrate mostly on female clients, and the var-
iation in the variable is therefore not large enough.




This paper contributes to the discussion on the
relationship between social outreach and financial
return of microfinance institutions by presenting
comprehensive empirical analysis using different
financial performance measures. The results indi-
cate that institutions charge female clients and
smaller loans higher interest rates. Because opera-
tional expenses increase at the same time, the total
influence on return measures (such as ROA, ROE,
OSS and profit margin) is very small, and in most
cases not statistically significant.
These findings suggest that some of the existing
studies identifying ambiguous results regarding
the relation between financial and social return
have not focused on the best choice of variables.
Return figures are influenced by both costs and
yield at the same time, and both increase with
greater depth of outreach. Most previous papers
have examined ROA, ROE, OSS or FSS in relation
to outreach. All four return measures are posi-
tively influenced by yield (earnings) and nega-
tively by costs. Supposing that outreach is
positively related to yield (as argued by Conning
1999 and reinforced by the present study) and
negatively to costs (supported by Hermes,
Lensink, and Meesters 2011; Cull, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Morduch 2007; Conning 1999 as well
as by the present study) the combined effect
results in zero or a very weak consequence on
return measures. This could explain the contra-
dictory results previously found on the relation-
ship between social and financial return in
microfinance (see the present study as well as
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2007;
Quayes 2012).
We find that the effect between outreach and
YIELD is slightly stronger than with OPEX, mean-
ing that higher costs are overcompensated at
higher levels of outreach. This is the reason why
we find a slightly positive interaction of outreach
with ROA and the profit margin, however at
a small level.
Our results hold if the data sample is differ-
entiated according to the state of formalization
of the MFIs. Nevertheless, the region in which
the MFI is active seems to be an important
consideration, as the results differ mainly for
MFIs in Africa, South Asia and East Asia and
the Pacific. Furthermore, results diverge for the
set of largest MFIs (above USD 50 Million total
assets), as for those 335 MFIs, the results do not
hold for the variable female, which is, in turn,
positively related to return measures. These dif-
ferences point to the fact that competition and
size of the institution might be an important
driver of the relationship between outreach and
financial performance, and, thus, future analyses
should concentrate on specific markets and dif-
ferentiate according to the size of the
institutions.
Form an investors’ perspective, the results indi-
cate that putting a focus on socially responsible
elements in their investment decisions, and
accordingly favouring MFIs with a focus on out-
reach, does not affect financial performance. The
expected trade-off between social and financial
factors does not seem to exist because higher
costs are covered through higher interest rates.
At a national level, an augmentation of inter-
est rates could lead to a ‘squeezing out of the
market’ of the poorest unbanked borrowers.
Consequently, total demand and the potential
of microfinance to contribute to the develop-
ment of financial markets would decrease. In
addition to the fact that the poorest borrowers
would no longer be the main target group for
the services offered, the total risk could increase.
While charging poorer clients higher interest
rates seems to be necessary to overcome higher
costs and potential default, this practice is not
consistent with the social nature of microfinance
institutions. The fact that the poorest clients
have to pay the most indicates a somewhat
‘unsocial’ strategy of the MFIs. Additional ana-
lyses on their loan policies might help to identify
whether they, in fact, adjust interest rates based
on clients’ profiles and loan sizes.
At the same time, new technological trends and
the techniques and criteria used by MFIs to deter-
mine interest rates require further research. The
link between operating costs and interest rates
could shift as digital finance mechanisms become
more important in microfinance. The use of tech-
nological innovation could enable MFIs to keep
transaction costs low, even for small loan sizes.
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